



## AFP INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S STRATEGIC RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESS IN RESPONSE TO EXTERNAL AGGRESSION

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### ABSTRACT

In the ever-changing global security landscape, characterized by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA), this study serves as a capstone project to provide valuable insights to the AFP Intelligence Community (AFPIC). Its primary focus is to effectively tackle the exceptional non-military security threats a foreign adversary poses. China's rapid and significant ascent as an Asian hegemon and a global superpower has driven its pursuit of resources and influence worldwide. These hegemonic actions have elicited resentment from smaller and weaker nations adversely affected by them and drawn the ire of the United States and its allies. The Philippines, strategically located in the South China Sea and the Pacific region, has become a prime target of China's unconventional warfare strategy, where they seek to subdue their adversaries without resorting to kinetic force. China's United Front Works (UFW) strategy is a crucial element of its hybrid warfare approach, providing a platform for intelligence, influence, and interference operations designed to systematically undermine its enemies. This study aims to describe the current state of the AFPIC's risk management capabilities in terms of doctrines, organization, and training concerning the security threats posed by China's UFW. It also seeks to identify the challenges in these areas and propose appropriate solutions to address them. Overall, the objective of this study is to contribute to the long-term endeavor of enhancing the AFPIC's doctrines, organization, and training to address the threats posed by China's UFW and other hybrid security threats effectively. The qualitative data gathered through document analysis, key informant interviews, and focused group discussions involving multiple participants from various units and offices within the AFPIC and the AFP Triad, as well as education and doctrine development circles, underwent an iterative and hybrid process of thematic and content analysis. Tools such as SWOT, TOWS, and the causal-impact analytical tool were utilized during this analytical process. The results of this analysis provided valuable insights into the current state of AFPIC's risk management capability in terms of doctrine, organization, and training, highlighting both the advantages and disadvantages within these areas. Further exploration revealed the primary challenges present in these three domains, which encompassed internal and external dynamics that hindered the optimal implementation of related initiatives. Subsequently, numerous recommendations were formulated to enhance the AFPIC's doctrine, organization, and training capabilities in response to the exceptional security threats posed by China's united front works. Central to the research findings were three crucial factors that influenced the success or failure of the doctrinal, organizational, and training endeavors: the support of advocates and champions, the role of knowledge management, and the significance of engaging foreign stakeholders.

*Keywords: China's United Front Works; influence and interference operations; intelligence operations; AFP Intelligence Community; hybrid security threats*

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## INTRODUCTION

The Philippines faces a complex security environment characterized by various requirements, interests, and incentives that need to be effectively balanced and managed to achieve national objectives. The safety, security, and resilience of the country are threatened by a range of hazards, including terrorism, cyber threats, pandemics, accidents, transnational crime, external aggression, insurgencies, and natural disasters. Alongside these external risks, the Philippines' security organizations must also address internal risks related to workforce management, acquisition operations, and project costs.

The United Front Works Department of the Communist Party of China (CPC) has a rich history that dates back to the Party's inception. This department is tasked with covert action and clandestine collection responsibilities (Eftimiades, 2017). Its acknowledged role involves implementing China's foreign policy through interactions with non-governmental organizations (non-communist) (Barnett, 2019). In this capacity, it engages in covert action by seeking to influence organizations in foreign countries to further Chinese foreign policy objectives.

ISO 31000 is an international standard for risk management. Published by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) (2018), it provides principles, guidelines, and a framework for managing risk effectively in organizations of all types and sizes. It guides on identifying, assessing, treating, monitoring, and communicating risks consistently and transparently.

Given its responsibility as the guardian of the country's territorial integrity, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) finds itself in a situation that calls for a well-defined strategy to effectively address the risks presented by China's United Front Works while simultaneously maintaining positive relations with the Chinese Government. In the context of China's comprehensive and long-term approach, which encompasses military transformation, influence and interference operations, psychological warfare, and predatory

economics aimed at shaping the external environment in a manner that aligns with its interests (US Department of Defense, 2018), the AFP Intelligence Community (AFPIC) assumes a critical role. It is entrusted with the task of understanding and countering the existing and emerging security threats faced by the nation as it confronts this evolving national security challenge. Consequently, addressing China's United Front Works, which serves as a platform for their intelligence gathering, interference operations, and exertion of influence, becomes a key priority for the AFPIC.

Instrumental in addressing such threats calls for astute conduct of risk management by the AFPIC. ISO 31000 defines the risk management process as the methodical implementation of management policies, procedures, and practices to effectively handle risks through activities such as communication, consultation, context establishment, risk identification, analysis, evaluation, treatment, monitoring, and review (International Organization for Standardization, 2018).

## OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

Specifically, the study aimed to accomplish the following objectives:

1. To describe the status of the AFPIC's Strategic Risk Management (SRM) process in terms of doctrines, organization, and training in addressing the security risks posed by PRC's United Front Works.
2. To determine the challenges in the AFPIC's SRM doctrine, organization, and training capabilities in addressing the security risks posed by PRC's UFW in the Philippines, including the vulnerabilities of the Philippines vis-a-vis hybrid security threats.
3. To recommend policies and a set of actions to address the said challenges.



## METHODOLOGY

*Research Design.* The purpose of this study is to determine the approaches in terms of doctrine, organization, and training that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) should adopt to enhance its Strategic Risk Management posture to counter the security risks posed by China's United Front Works (UFW). Thus, the researcher will use qualitative research through a Descriptive-Evaluative Research Design Method.

*Locale of the Study.* The general locale of the study is the National Capital Region, particularly Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo in Quezon City and Headquarters, Philippine Army in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. Participants/respondents from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence (J2), the Special Intelligence Training School, various counterintelligence and strategic intelligence units, the AFP Education, Training, and Doctrine Command, and Headquarters of the Intelligence Service Armed Forces of the Philippines are situated at Camp Aguinaldo.

*Sampling Design.* The researcher selected the purposive sampling approach for the key informed interviews and focused group discussions on identifying subject matter experts (SME) who are knowledgeable within their respective professions.

*Data Collection Procedures.* Following the Descriptive Research Design, the researcher performed the following research-gathering activities: Before the interview, formal letters were sent to the identified KILs. The researcher shall ask them their preferred mode of interviews, either via Zoom teleconferencing or by filling out Google Forms.

*Data Analysis.* After conducting the interviews and focus group discussions, the researcher transcribed the responses using the Quirkos analytical tool, through which the researcher determined the emerging codes and themes using the standard thematic analysis procedure. Thematic analysis is a method for

studying qualitative data that comprises examining a data set for repeating patterns, understanding them, and reporting them (Clark & Braun, 2013).

## RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The purpose of this research was to determine the approaches that the Armed Forces of the Philippines Intelligence Community (AFPIC) should adopt in the development of its strategic risk management capability in terms of doctrine, organization, and training to effectively respond to the security risks posed by China's United Front Works (UFW). The research also analyzed the specific objectives separately; firstly, to identify the current capability or status of the AFP Intelligence Community's strategic risk management in addressing the security risks posed by China's UFW in terms of doctrine, organization, and training; secondly, to determine the gaps in the aforesaid capabilities; and lastly, to recommend actions to address the said challenges. To add depth and rigor to the data that were gathered from documents, key informant interviews, and focus group discussions, analytical tools such as the S-W-O-T, and causal-impact analysis tools were used within the content and thematic analysis process.

### **1. The status of the AFP Intelligence Community's (AFPIC) doctrinal, organizational, and training capabilities in relation to strategic risk management in addressing the security risks posed by China's United Front Works**

#### **1.1. Doctrines**

Using the thematic analysis process prescribed by Clark & Braun (2013), the data from the key informant interviews and the focused group discussion yielded meta-



categories or themes that provide a description of what an optimal doctrine must be vis-a-vie security threats posed by UFW and other special threats with related attributes. Figure 1 illustrates the emerging themes from KII and FGD.

Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal state of doctrines vis-a-vie confronting extraordinary security threats such as China's United Front Works (UFW) is based on seven (7) attributes:

- a. Broadly written and with focus – as with other doctrines, UFW-related doctrines must be broadly written to allow for operational adjustment and flexibility.
- b. Exemplifies jointness – doctrines must allow for inter-Services collaboration and integration by using terminologies and concepts that are understandable by all operating units, and consistent with the principles and concepts of the joint and combined operational methodologies.




Figure 1 – Emerging Themes on Doctrine

c. Must be progressive – doctrines must lend themselves to continuous development to ensure that they address the security threats that are also constantly emerging amid the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous strategic environments that cover both the local and international stages.

d. Applicable to the threats being confronted – the doctrine, despite being written broadly, must properly articulate the guidelines on addressing specific security threats.

e. Leverages best practices and lessons learned – doctrines must be the product of continuous learning and realization in the conduct of operations.

f. Undergoes wide consultation – doctrines must undergo the standard development processes mandated by the AFP doctrine development units. Together with adhering to the standard development processes, doctrines must undergo extensive and careful consultations with relevant stakeholders, both internal and external.

g. Supported by the top leadership and advocates – doctrine development about special and emerging security threats, such as China's United Front Works (UFW) must be supported by the top leadership of the defense and military establishments.

Based on the emerged themes describing the optimal status of doctrine vis-a-vie dealing with China's united front works, and upon the consolidation and processing of insights from the participants of the focused group discussions (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state of doctrine is succinctly described as follows:

a) Too broad. Focus must be articulated. There is a need to articulate the security threats being addressed. Currently, the content of doctrinal references related to Chinese security threats focuses on the workings and intentions of foreign intelligence and propaganda operatives.

b) Exemplifies jointness. Currently, the doctrinal references related to hybrid security threats offer great room for inter-operability and jointness among and between AFP units across the Major Services (Army, Air Force, and Navy).

c) Lacks progress. There were stalled efforts to develop doctrinal references about hybrid





security threats, including threats posed by China's united front works. Most of these reference materials being developed are being reduced into reference materials exclusive to particular intelligence units.

d) Starting to consolidate lessons learned and best practices. Currently, the AFPIC is embarking on a strategic effort to consolidate the lessons learned and best practices in addressing hybrid security threats.

e) Limited consultation. Some consultations transpired between certain units and offices, but due to uncertainty and compartmentalization, the optimal benefits that these units are supposed to gain from such consultation are not being achieved, contributing to the lack of concerted and united efforts in addressing the aforesaid threats.

f) Less support from the top. Currently, it is lamentable that doctrine development pertaining to addressing hybrid security threats does not enjoy significant support from the top.

With the aforesaid description based on integrated analysis, it can be concluded that at present, in terms of organization, the AFPIC is partially capable of addressing the security risks posed by China's united front works, and other security challenges connected to the Asian hegemon.

## 2. Organization

Using the thematic analysis process prescribed by Clark & Braun (2013), the data from the key informant interviews and the focused group discussion yielded meta-categories or themes that describe what an optimal organization must be vis-a-vie security threats posed by UFW and other special threats with related attributes. Figure 2 illustrates the emerging themes from KII and FGD.

Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal state of the organization vis-a-vie confronting special security threats such as China's United

Front Works (UFW) is based on seven (7) attributes:




Figure 2 – Emerging Themes on Organization

Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal state of the organization vis-a-vie confronting special security threats such as China's United Front Works (UFW) is based on seven (7) attributes:

a. Allocates tasks – the organization must allocate specific tasks or intelligence coverage for every intelligence office and operating unit. Allocating intelligence tasks ensures comprehensive coverage of the security threats being addressed, and avoids unnecessary overlaps.

b. Exemplifies unity of efforts – an organizational structure dealing with all security threats should integrate all efforts across various levels and domains.

c. Based on experiences, acquired knowledge, and best practices. The organization must leverage the available information, knowledge, lessons learned, and best practices from years of dealing with such special security challenges.

d. Aspires to achieve a common understanding – an organization must integrate, share, and make sense of all intelligence insights pertaining to security threats. This is to ensure that operating units possess a standard, updated, and



common operational understanding of the threats they are dealing with.

e. Leverages specialties and competencies – the organization must be able to make the most out of the specialties and competencies developed by its people in dealing with unique security concerns.

f. Fosters stakeholders collaboration – the organization must aspire to constantly engage and collaborate with its internal and external stakeholders in order to achieve optimum operational results through multi-agency operations.

g. Supported by the top leadership and advocates - any organization, despite possessing excellent competencies and institutional knowledge, will never progress without the essential support from the top leadership.

Based on the emerged themes describing the optimal status of the organization vis-a-vie dealing with China's united front works, and upon the consolidation and processing of insights from the participants of the focused group discussions (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state of the organization is succinctly described as follows:

a. Tasks not properly allocated or assigned - despite units that take the initiative to study and confront the security threats posed by complex entities connected to Chinese United Front works, there is no clear task allocation as to what unit will confront what aspects of the security threats.

b. Lesser unity of efforts; starting to unify efforts - More often than not, units involved in dealing with special security threats, most especially that of China, lack unity of efforts. Despite this attribute, the OJ2 is now starting to organize a unified action to confront the security risks posed by China.

c. Best practices and lessons learned are not widely disseminated and discussed. Despite the

accumulation of significant experiences and insights in the conduct of counterintelligence operations against security threats posed by China, these invaluable findings are not properly and widely disseminated even across the APFIC.

d. Moving towards achieving a common and shared operational picture and threats appreciation. The current thrust of the AFP doctrine development initiative is developing doctrinal materials that foster inter-operability or jointness among and between the different units of the AFP and across the Major Services.

e. Currently leverages available expertise. Despite limited dissemination of lessons learned and best practices, there are units within the AFPIC that leverage their capabilities and expertise in dealing with special kinds of security threats, such as China's united front works, as well as China's intelligence and propaganda operations.

f. Hindered by a lack of focus, lack of command guidance, and direction. This implies the lack of concrete guidance from the top on what to prioritize or what aspects to prioritize and if there are any prioritization of efforts.

g. Lesser support compared to other organizational initiatives - compared to support being accorded by top leadership (political, defense, and military) to intelligence and security operations related to communist insurgent groups and terrorist organizations, efforts related to China, apart from its military activities in the West Philippine Sea, receives lesser support and attention.

With the aforesaid description based on integrated analysis, it can be concluded that at present, in terms of organization, the AFPIC is partially capable of addressing the security risks posed by China's united front works and other security challenges connected to the Asian hegemon.

#### 4. Training



Using the thematic analysis process prescribed by Clark & Braun (2013), the data from the key informant interviews and the focused group discussion yielded meta-categories or themes that describe what optimal training programs must be vis-a-vie security threats posed by UFW and other special threats with related attributes. Figure 3 illustrates the emerging themes from KII and FGD.




Figure 3 – Emerging Themes on Training

Based on the analytical illustration, the optimal state of training vis-a-vie confronting special security threats such as China’s United Front Works (UFW) is based on six (6) attributes:

- a) Standard. Training programs must be based on doctrines and must be uniform and consistent across the AFPIC.
- b) Widely consulted. Training programs confronting special security threats such as China’s united front works must be developed in cohorts with relevant international and local stakeholders and across the major services and unified commands in order to ensure the highest quality of content and delivery.
- c) Periodically reviewed and progressive. Mindful of the constantly emerging security nature of the threats amid the volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous security environment, training

programs that deal with security threats posed by China must be regularly reviewed by the collaborative efforts of essential stakeholders.

d) Capitalized on best practices and lessons learned. Training programs must be based on consolidated experiences of operating units from years of dealing with complex and hybrid security threats posed by China and other foreign and transnational security threats.

e) Involved stakeholders in the development and refinement process. Due to the special and dynamic nature of the security risks posed by China, collaborative efforts with local and international stakeholders are essential in order to acquire the most up-to-date insights pertaining to the threat and acquire the best ways to deliver and manage the training programs.

f) With support from the top. Training development pertaining to special and emerging security threats, such as China’s United Front Works (UFW), must be supported by the top leadership of the defense and military establishments. Support must also be generated from the political leadership and other government entities, as well as private organizations.

Based on the emerged themes describing the optimal status of training vis-a-vie dealing with China’s united front works, and upon the consolidation and processing of insights from the participants of the focused group discussions (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) by the use of SWOT analysis, the current capabilities or state of the training is succinctly described as follows:

- a) No standard training. Several training programs or specialized courses are still under construction. Further, doctrinal basis or connection is hardly reflected in these training initiatives.
- b) Not widely consulted. Limited discussions are going on within the AFPIC as regards institutionalizing specialized and standard training programs.

c) Not periodically reviewed since no standard training programs are in place. Several training programs pertaining to Chinese-related threats, such as intelligence and propaganda operations, united front works, and gray zone tactics are narrowly discussed across the AFPIC.

d) Progress cannot be determined so far. But efforts to develop training programs on ongoing. The Special Intelligence Training School in collaboration with the Strategic Intelligence Force of ISAFP, is developing a training program or course intended to conduct intelligence operations overseas.

e) Limited dissemination and discussion of best practices and lessons learned. Currently, some units within the AFPIC have learned and experienced significant lessons in dealing with security threats related to China. However, due to seemingly too much compartmentalization and the lack of strategic direction, sharing these invaluable insights is not thoroughly pursued, if at all.

f) Currently, the AFPIC is involving local and foreign/international stakeholders in conducting training and workshops pertaining to threats posed by China. Academic institutions and think tanks, both local and international, regularly provide insights and launch training programs related to the multi-dimensional nature of security threats posed by China.

g) Limited support from the top. Currently, there is no explicit support from the top as to the development and pursuit of relevant threat-based training. Even though there are initiatives such as workshops and conferences pertaining to security development related to China, these events are done on a case-to-case basis and not progressively and regularly.

h) With the aforesaid description based on integrated analysis, it can be concluded that, at present, in terms of training, the AFPIC is partially capable of addressing the security risks posed by China's united front works, and other security challenges connected to the Asian hegemon.

### 3. The challenges in the AFPIC's doctrine, organization, and training

#### 3.1. Doctrine

The following analysis took off from the insights generated from Figure 1, which presented the emerging themes related to doctrine development from the collective insights taken from FGD and KII. Figure 4 is an influence diagram that showcases how the different factors that characterize the current doctrine are influenced by several factors, such as political influences, the prospects of incentives, and the ISO-centric mindsets of doctrine developers and intelligence officers.




Figure 4-Doctrine Influence Diagram

#### 3.2. Organization

The following analysis took off from the insights generated from Figure 5, which presented the emerging themes related to organizational initiatives and development from the collective insights taken from FGD and KII.




Figure 5- Organization Influence Diagram



Figure 5 is an influence diagram that showcases how the different factors that characterize the current organization are influenced by several factors, such as the lack of champions or advocates to support the organization, the pre-occupation of intelligence units to complying with the deadline for ending the communist armed conflicts, and the continuous emphasis accorded to and attractiveness of internal security operations (ISO) which yield results that are easily recognizable and are easily commended or praised, in contrast to efforts related to hybrid security threats such as China's UFW, which are very subtle, and most of the time barely even noticed by the top leadership.

### 3.3. Training

The following analysis took off from the insights generated from Figure 6, which presented the emerging themes related to training initiatives and development from the collective insights taken from FGD and KII.




Figure 6 – Training Influence Diagram

Figure 6 is an influence diagram that showcases how the different factors that characterize the current training related to China's UFW are influenced by several factors, such as the lack of doctrine upon which training programs will be based, the complexity of hybrid threats posed by China, the ease of teaching ISO-related tradecraft

skills, and the ongoing debate whether to limit the AFP scope with the military domain of China, setting aside non-military risks posed by China to civilian government law enforcement and regulatory agencies for appropriate counteractions. Training managers give priority to preserving and propagating ISO lessons and best practices.

## 4. Recommended policies and a set of actions to address the challenges

### 4.1. Doctrine

Information acquired from the key informant interview and the focus group discussion agreed on the four common aspects:

- The need for a Doctrine Summit pertaining to hybrid security threats posed by foreign adversaries;
- the need for sponsors and advocates at the highest levels of the organization to support the doctrine development agenda;
- the need for a systematic risk assessment process; and
- the need to engage and leverage local and international stakeholders to enhance and advocate for the doctrine development efforts pertaining to foreign security threats.

Research participants also highlighted the need for proactive and effective risk management efforts to address the security risks posed by a foreign adversary such as China. Research participants stressed the importance of engaging in collaborating with local and international counterparts in developing the doctrine vis-a-vis security threats posed by China's united front works and gray zone on strategies.

### 4.2. Organization

The focused group discussion (FGD) yielded three recommendations from the participants to



address the growing threat of China's United Front Works in the Philippines. In terms of organization, participants discussed and agreed on the following course of action for the AFPIC:

- a. Create a dedicated unit that will be primarily responsible for addressing the threats posed by China's united front works and Chinese intelligence and influence operations;
- b. Involve Civil-Military Operations (CMO) units in addressing Chinese security threats, especially in the development of appropriate information and operations lines, as well as engaging or interfacing with China-affiliated organizations that are identified to be intelligence collection and influence operations fronts or platforms of China.; and
- c. Set a stable, predictable, and incentive-laden career path for civilian intelligence analysts who are at the forefront of generating strategic intelligence insights for decision-makers and preserving institutional knowledge.

Information acquired from the key informant interview and the focus group discussion agreed on the five common aspects essential to enhancing the AFPIC's organizational capabilities against China's united front works and other hybrid security threats posed by foreign adversaries and transnational threat groups, as follows:

- a. issue clearcut task allocation; develop doctrinal references since these will drive the organizational development process;
- b. the need to refine or revise the evaluation criteria for success in dealing with complex security threats; and
- c. the need for supporters and advocates from the strategic leaders; the continuous engagement with foreign allies to learn from them on matters related to organizational structures and threat knowledge and strategies.

### 4.3. Training

KII provided insights on how to remediate the challenges currently faced by the AFPIC in terms of training vis-a-vis security threats posed by China's UFW. Similarly, FGD provided insights on how to remediate the challenges faced by the AFPIC in terms of training vis-a-vis security threats posed by China's UFW. Members of the focused group discussion discussed and agreed that lessons learned and best practices must be properly documented, shared, and discussed in the different military and intelligence training institutions.

Information acquired from the key informant interview and the focus group discussion agreed on the four common recommendations to enhance training vis-a-vis security threats posed by China's UFW: dedicated office or center for China studies; the need for training supporters from the top leadership; the development of doctrinal materials as these will drive the training development process; the need to engage and collaborate with local and foreign stakeholders who are subject matter experts in China-related security studies, hybrid security threats, and international relations and geopolitics.

Research participants highlighted the need to continuously engage local and foreign stakeholders who have expertise in hybrid and complex security challenges, which include China's united front works.

### CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, this study finds that the AFP Intelligence Community (AFPIC)'s doctrines, organization, and training have some capability to perform strategic risk management to address the security threats posed by China's United Front Works (UFW). However, several challenges are hindering their effectiveness, including the priority given to ISO-related operations, the lack of strong advocates and proponents at the strategic levels of the government, the inward focus of the AFP's risk management process, and the complexities of

dealing with non-military threats from formidable foreign adversaries like China.

Based on the thematic analysis of research data, three factors emerged as influential in the AFPIC's capabilities: advocates and champions, knowledge management, and foreign stakeholder engagement.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

**Proposed Strategic Risk Management Framework for the AFP Intelligence Community**




Figure 7 – The Proposed Strategic Risk Management Framework for AFPIC

Figure 7 showcases the AFPIC Strategic Risk Management Framework, which has been developed based on the findings and efforts of this dissertation. The framework provides a comprehensive approach that takes into account both external factors (PESTELM) and internal attributes (McKinsey's 7-S) of the AFPIC.

In strategic risk management against security risks posed by external forces, the use of analytical frameworks such as PESTLE and McKinsey 7S can provide valuable insights into both external and internal factors.

**PESTLE Analysis:** PESTLE (Political, Economic, Sociocultural, Technological, Legal, and Environmental) analysis is a framework used to examine the external factors that can impact an organization's operations and risk landscape.

a. Political factors: Assessing political factors involves examining government policies, regulations, and geopolitical dynamics that may influence security risks.

b. Economic factors: Evaluating economic factors involves analyzing economic conditions, trends, and potential financial impacts on security risks. This includes factors such as economic growth, inflation, exchange rates, and trade policies.

c. Sociocultural factors: Examining sociocultural factors involves understanding social and cultural influences that may impact security risks. This includes factors such as demographics, social attitudes, cultural norms, and public opinion.

d. Technological factors: Assessing technological factors involves analyzing advancements, innovations, and the impact of technology on security risks.

e. Legal factors: Evaluating legal factors involves considering laws, regulations, and legal frameworks that may affect security risks. This includes analyzing relevant legislation, compliance requirements, and potential legal implications.

f. Environmental factors: Examining environmental factors involves assessing environmental conditions and sustainability issues that may impact security risks. This includes factors such as climate change, natural disasters, and resource availability.

g. Military factor - The military and law enforcement agencies play a crucial role in ensuring the security and defense of a nation. They are responsible for safeguarding the country against external threats, such as terrorism, foreign aggression, and organized crime.

The McKinsey 7S framework is a tool used to analyze internal factors within an organization that can influence its risk management capabilities. It examines seven interconnected elements:

**Strategy:** Within the Intelligence Community, examining the organization's strategic goals and



objectives is essential for aligning risk management efforts with overarching priorities.

b. Structure: The organizational structure within the Intelligence Community influences the flow of information, decision-making processes, and coordination mechanisms related to risk management.

c. Systems: Robust systems and processes are vital for identifying, assessing, and responding to security risks. This includes the development and implementation of risk assessment methodologies, information-sharing protocols, early warning systems, and incident response mechanisms.

d. Skills: The knowledge, expertise, and capabilities of personnel involved in risk management are critical.

e. Staff: The proper allocation and utilization of human resources are essential for risk management within the Intelligence Community.

f. Style: Leadership style, organizational culture, and values greatly influence risk management practices within the Intelligence Community.

g. Shared values: Assessing the shared beliefs, norms, and attitudes towards risk management within the organization.

When dealing with security risks posed by China, various risk treatment measures can be applied using the framework of avoiding, reducing, accepting, and transferring risks. Here's how these measures can be applied by the AFPIC:

1) Avoiding

a. Diplomatic engagements: Engage in diplomatic talks and negotiations to avoid potential conflicts and reduce tensions related to territorial disputes or other security concerns.

b. Diversifying dependencies: Reduce reliance on China by diversifying economic, trade,

and investment partnerships to avoid overdependence on a single country.

c. Enhanced cybersecurity: Strengthen cybersecurity defenses and measures to avoid cyber threats and reduce vulnerabilities that could be exploited by China.

2) Reducing

a. Military deterrence: Enhance military capabilities and deterrence measures to reduce the risk of aggression or territorial disputes escalating into armed conflicts.

b. Counterintelligence measures: Implement robust counterintelligence measures to detect and mitigate China's influence operations, cyber espionage, and intelligence-gathering activities.

c. Building regional alliances: Strengthen partnerships and alliances with neighboring countries and like-minded nations to collectively address security concerns and counterbalance China's influence.

3) Accepting

a. Balancing economic interests: Assess the potential risks and benefits of economic engagement with China and make informed decisions on accepting certain risks in pursuit of economic growth and cooperation.

b. Managing limited influence: Recognize the limits of influence over China's domestic affairs and accept the constraints in areas where the Philippines may have limited leverage.

4) Transferring

a. International cooperation: Foster cooperation with other countries, regional organizations, and international institutions to collectively address security risks posed by China through information sharing, joint exercises, and collaborative initiatives.





b. Engaging international arbitration: Seek recourse through international arbitration mechanisms to resolve territorial disputes or other legal challenges.

It is crucial to emphasize that risk treatment measures must be context-specific, timely, and customized to address the specific security risks faced by the Philippines or any other country.

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